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Share optionsThis paper investigates the motives for disclosing an alternative earnings per share (EPS) ﬁgure. In particular,
we extend prior ﬁndings for the UK (Choi, Lin, Walker & Young, 2007) by highlighting the role of managerial
contracting in the alternative EPS disclosure choice. We examine a speciﬁc contractual setting where man-
agement is especially sensitive to reported earnings numbers, i.e., when EPS performance targets exist in
the managerial remuneration package. Our analysis suggests that the choice to disclose an alternative EPS ﬁg-
ure is positively related to ﬁrms where the vesting of executive share options (ESOs) is contingent on the
achievement of growth in EPS. Our results remain signiﬁcant after testing for selection bias, direction of cau-
sality and after matching ﬁrms on variables prior literature identiﬁes as inﬂuential in the choice of an EPS tar-
get as a performance criterion in executive remuneration.
© 2012 Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
Most UK listed ﬁrms make use of some form of vesting condition
in executive compensation contracts that include share-based incen-
tive components. In order for the majority of equity-based schemes to
vest, the performance of the ﬁrm must satisfy one or more speciﬁc
vesting conditions. Some compensation contracts make use of vesting
conditions based on the ﬁrms’ stock market performance while other
contracts make use of vesting conditions based on accounting mea-
sures of performance such as earnings per share (EPS) growth, or
both. We expect the existence and nature of these vesting conditions
to affect ﬁrms’ disclosure choices.
The motivation of this study is to explore the relation between the
use of EPS performance based vesting targets in executive share op-
tion plans (ESOs) and the decision of whether or not to disclose an al-
ternative EPS ﬁgure. Given that both EPS targets and alternative EPS
ﬁgures use similar EPS deﬁnitions, that is, typically focus on perma-
nent earnings excluding transitory items, we expect ﬁrms with EPS
targets to disclose alternative EPS ﬁgures more often. We argue that
this is consistent with the notion of shareholders attempting to mea-
sure and reward only the managerial effort that contributes towards
the objective of long-term value maximization. Although the choice353 61 213188.
hopoulos@mbs.ac.uk
r).
license.to disclose an alternative EPS ﬁgure is voluntary, the majority of our
sampled ﬁrms chose to disclose an alternative EPS ﬁgure. This wide-
spread use of alternative EPS ﬁgures supports the importance of en-
hancing our understanding regarding this disclosure choice.
A prior study ﬁnds that the disclosure of an alternative EPS (non-
GAAP) ﬁgure in the UK is mainly motivated by management's desire
to supplement basic EPS with a more informative alternative EPS ﬁg-
ure (Choi, Lin, Walker, & Young, 2007). Choi et al. (2007) ﬁnd that
managers on average exclude transitory items when reporting non-
GAAP earnings and this, they show, enhances market value. In this
paper, we argue that contractual agreements, in particular those re-
garding remuneration, between management and shareholders also
heighten the desire to disclose more informative accounting ﬁgures.
Our study tests this conjecture.
The separation of ownership and control within a ﬁrm results in the
need to monitor the actions of the managers (Jensen & Meckling,
1976). One of the objectives facing the designers of executive remunera-
tion contracts is to do so in such away as to ensuremanagers act tomax-
imise the wealth of the shareholders. Shareholders are interested in the
growth potential of ﬁrms and, under efﬁcient contracting, will design ex-
ecutive compensation to motivate the executives to increase the long-
term value of the ﬁrm. The performance target chosen by the majority
of sampled UK ﬁrms in order for ESOs to vest is growth in EPS. Our curso-
ry examination of annual reports indicates that remuneration commit-
tees, acting on behalf of the shareholders, set performance measures
that capture managerial effort on what is of concern to shareholders,
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tory items and intangibles (like goodwill amortisation) from the deﬁni-
tion of the target EPS as these are neither under the direct control of
management nor are they helpful in assessing the long-term potential
of theﬁrm (Gaver&Gaver, 1998; Doyle, Lundholm, & Soliman, 2003). As-
suming that shareholders act efﬁciently in setting executive remunera-
tion performance targets, as well as that the alternative EPS ﬁgure is a
better indicator of managerial effort and more value relevant (see Choi
et al., 2007), we expect a positive relation between EPS targets in ESOs
and the disclosure of an alternative EPS ﬁgure.
Our analysis, based on a large sample of UK ﬁrms, supports the pos-
itive relation between the disclosure of an alternative EPS ﬁgure and the
existence of EPS targets in ESOs. This positive relation is more pro-
nounced in ﬁrms with high levels of intangible assets, which is consis-
tent with the notion that shareholders use alternative EPS ﬁgures in
ﬁrms where measuring managerial effort towards long-term value
maximisation is difﬁcult. Additional analyses conﬁrm that the disclo-
sure of an alternative EPS ﬁgure is mainly driven by the desire to pro-
vide more informative earnings ﬁgures. Our results are robust to a
number of checks which address endogeneity, selection bias, and direc-
tion of causality.
Our work contributes to the disclosure and compensation litera-
tures. First, we focus on a particular design feature of remuneration con-
tracts which provides a unique opportunity to test the link between
remuneration structure decisions and disclosure choices by ﬁrms. Sec-
ond, we extend work on non-GAAP reporting by Walker & Louvari
(2003) by examining a contracting motivation for the decision to dis-
close an alternative EPS ﬁgure.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next Sec-
tion, we present the literature review and hypothesis development; in
Section 3 we present our research design; in Section 4 we present our
results. Finally, we offer some discussion and conclusions in Section 5.
2. Prior literature and hypothesis development
2.1. Executive share-based compensation practice in the UK
Share-based compensation to executives continues to attract atten-
tion as a result of the high pay-outs and the perceived lack of a relation-
ship between performance and pay. At ﬁrst, the only share-based
element of executive compensation planswere ESOswhich traditionally
had zero intrinsic value at the date of grant and had no performance
conditions attached to their vesting. In the US, ESOs fell out of favour
in the 1970s following a prolonged depression in the US stock market
(Jensen & Murphy, 2004). In contrast, during the period 1992–98,
Jensen &Murphy (2004) estimate that the annual dollar value of option
awards to CEOs increased by more than 300%. Conyon, Core, & Guay
(2011) ﬁnd that the median UK CEO received more risk-adjusted pay
than the median US CEO in 2003, a reversal of the 1997 situation.
As mentioned above, efﬁcient compensation contracts should link
pay to performance thus providing executives with incentives to maxi-
mise shareholder value. This does not necessarily imply the exclusive
use of market-based performance measures to reward managers is an
optimal choice. Instrumental in creating a strong link between pay
and performance is the use and disclosure of any good quality perfor-
mancemeasure that allows shareholders to better assessmanagerial ef-
fort and the long-term impact of this effort to ﬁrm value.
One might have expected share-based compensation, and in partic-
ular ESOs, to have broken the link between accounting-basedmeasures
of performance and performance-related pay. However,manyﬁrms use
share-based compensation contracts that make explicit use of vesting
criteria based on accounting performance. For example, most executive
compensation contracts in our sample require speciﬁc EPS-based per-
formance targets to be achieved in order for options to vest. This is
the result of pressure from institutional investors, for example the Asso-
ciation of British Industries (ABI) guidelines, which among other thingsrecommends the use of EPS growth targets (ABI, 1999). Therefore, the
UK provides a unique setting for our study. In contrast, in the US most
equity-linked compensation until recently lacked a predetermined per-
formance hurdle (Balsam, Kuang, & Qin, 2011).
During our sample period, the majority of ESOs in our UK sample
ﬁrms have 3-year EPS growth targets (deﬁned generally as a percentage
plus the Retail Price Index) which have to be met before any options
vest. This is consistent with Pass (2006) who studied 51 constituent
companies of the FTSE 100 for 1994–2003 and found:
‘In all 38 out of the 45 companies currently operating options
schemes target EPS, while 29 of the 36 companies currently using
a LTIP target TSR’ (Pass, 2006:301).
Long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) are restricted stock schemes,
which have a zero exercise price. For our sample ﬁrms, we also ﬁnd
that LTIPs typically have TSR targets. Therefore, to address our research
question we concentrate on ESOs.
While there is a lack of clarity in some annual reports on the actual
deﬁnition of EPS used as the performance target in ESOs, generally
ﬁrms appear to use a deﬁnition which would effectively be a non-
GAAP EPS. Manifest Information Systems Ltd, a global proxy voting
and corporate governance support service, corroborates our contention
that earnings per share before exceptional items and amortisation of
goodwill is ‘probably most common in reality and often the one used
when just “EPS” is stated’ over the period of our study. In addition, evi-
dence from annual reports also indicates that shareholders deﬁne the
EPS performance target so it excludes transitory items and goodwill
which is a bettermeasure of future earnings andmanagerial effort. Typ-
ical examples of the conditions applicable to UK executive share option
schemes are:
Spectris plc, Report and Accounts 2003, 22:
Exercise of share options…are subject to prior achievement of a per-
formance condition, as approved by shareholders, requiring com-
pound growth in earnings per share before exceptional items and
amortisation of goodwill (“EPS”) over threeﬁnancial years of at least
2% per annum in excess of the increase in the retail price index.
Shanks plc, Annual Report and Accounts 2003, 23:
Options granted after 26 July 2001 will only be exercisable if the
Group's earnings per share, before taking into account exceptional
and extraordinary items and goodwill amortisation for the three-
yearmeasurement period, have increased by at least ninepercentage
points over the increase in the Retail Price Index for the same period.
2.2. The earnings per share ﬁnancial reporting standard
For the sample period of this study the standard governing the dis-
closure of EPS in the UK is Financial Reporting Standard 3 (FRS 3),
Reporting Financial Performance, issued by the Accounting Standards
Board (ASB, 1992). FRS 3 requires only one basic EPS number to be in-
cluded in published ﬁnancial statements and importantly the precise
deﬁnition of how this basic EPS ﬁgure is to be calculated is deﬁned in
FRS 3. Where a ﬁrm chooses to disclose an alternative EPS measure,
the standard requires the chosen alternative to be calculated consistent-
ly over time and the standard also requires that the alternative ﬁgure
should be reconciled to the FRS 3 EPS ﬁgure. In addition, any alternative
EPS ﬁgure should be disclosed with an equal or lower level of promi-
nence as the FRS 3 EPS ﬁgure. FRS 3 allows but does not require ﬁrms
to disclose an alternative EPS ﬁgure (Walker & Louvari, 2003).
The investigation of the decision to disclose an alternative EPS ﬁgure
is thus an interesting research question given the fact that management
have control over whether or not an alternative EPS ﬁgure is disclosed
in addition to having control over its deﬁnition.
1 Managers could also act opportunistically and use the disclosure of an alternative
EPS ﬁgure to present more favourable results and thus meet the required target for
their ESOs to vest. But prior evidence in the UK is inconsistent with this view (Choi
et al., 2007). In addition, as our sample includes a large cross-section the likelihood
of the average ﬁrm engaging in opportunistic disclosure over consecutive years is
lessened.
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UK GAAP was still the relevant accounting standard. Voulgaris,
Stathopoulos, & Walker (2011) report that ﬁrms make less use of
accounting-based performance measures in executive compensation,
post-IFRS. Voulgaris et al. (2011)maintain that IFRS added “noise” to ac-
counting numbers making reported earnings less useful for evaluating
managerial performance. Therefore, our study is not affected by this ex-
ogenous change in accounting standards and its subsequent potential
effect on ﬁrm accounting choices.
2.3. The accounting choice literature
Choi, Lin, Walker, & Young (2005) review the studies which have
focused on understanding why some ﬁrms disclose non-GAAP earnings.
There are two strands of thinking on non-GAAP earnings disclosures. The
ﬁrst strand indicates that such disclosuresmay be strategicallymotivated
with management using such disclosures to divert attention away from
poor underlying performance (Matsumoto, 2002; Burgstahler & Eames,
2003). The other strand reports that some managers appear to use
non-GAAP earnings disclosures to supplement the informativeness of
GAAP earnings. For example, Verrecchia (1983) demonstrates how
better quality information available tomanagers can result in greater vol-
untary disclosure of non-proprietary information. The implication is that
managers have incentives to disclose value-relevant non-proprietary in-
formationwhen it is of higher quality thanpublicly available information.
Lougee & Marquardt (2004) concur and document that ﬁrms with less
informative GAAP earnings are more likely to include non-GAAP
earnings information in their quarterly earnings releases. Lougee &
Marquardt (2004) interpret their results as evidence that voluntary
non-GAAP earnings disclosures are motivated by management's desire
to supplement uninformative GAAP earningswithmore useful measures
of sustainable periodic performance. In a study of disclosure practices in
the UK, Choi et al. (2007) conclude:
“Although some ﬁrms appear to use non-GAAP earnings disclo-
sures to artiﬁcially boost reported performance, opportunism does
not appear to characterize our data on average” (Choi et al., 2007:
618).
The components of earnings may be classiﬁed as recurring or tran-
sitory and investors appear to understand this distinction and apply a
lower weight to transitory items (Bradshaw & Sloan, 2002). Choi et al.
(2007) ﬁnd that management-speciﬁc adjustments to GAAP earnings
more likely reﬂect superior knowledge of the persistence of earnings
components. In addition, analysts and compensation committees ap-
pear to largely exclude transitory expenses when determining actual
earnings and compensation (Gaver & Gaver, 1998; Doyle et al., 2003).
For their sample of UK ﬁrms, Choi et al. (2007) provide characteristics
of earning components excluded by management from GAAP EPS.
Firms disclosing non-GAAP EPS, in 2001, typically omit the following
two items: 74.1% exclude amortization of goodwill and 22.3% exclude
‘other speciﬁed exceptional items’. A further 9.4% exclude the ‘impair-
ment, diminution or write off of goodwill’.
The setting for this research is particularly useful as it provides a
sample of ﬁrms where a component of executive compensation incor-
porates a relatively uniform performance target (growth in EPS). Addi-
tionally, we can determine whether or not an alternative EPS ﬁgure is
disclosed thus allowing an opportunity to ask whether equity-based
compensation providesmanagerswith incentives to bemore forthcom-
ing with disclosure.
2.4. Hypothesis development
In an agency theory setting, which portrays the ﬁrm as a set of con-
tractual relations among stakeholders, there is a signiﬁcant role for ac-
counting performance measures when such measures are incrementallyinformative with respect to management's actions or when their use en-
courages efﬁcient risk-sharing between contracting parties (Gjesdal,
1981; Holmström, 1979; Lambert & Larcker, 1987; Sloan, 1993). The
choice of a performance measure in executive compensation contracts
depends on how informative it is about the manager's actions
(Holmström, 1979; Lambert, 2001), since optimal theory suggests that
managers should be rewarded for their actions (i.e. contribution towards
the ﬁrm's output) and not the actual output (Lambert, 1983). Equity
returns, like every performance measure, is a function of the manager's
actions and an amount of “noise” which is out of the manager's control.
The inclusion of an accounting-based measure helps mitigate the
“noise” out of manager's control (Baker, 1987; Lambert & Larcker, 1987;
Sloan, 1993). Thus, under efﬁcient contracting one should expect share-
holders to link executive compensation to an EPS ﬁgurewhich ismore in-
formative of managerial effort (alternative EPS) and then to push for the
disclosure of this alternative EPS ﬁgure. As shareholders are interested in
the long-term performance of the ﬁrm, we propose that they reward
managers on the basis of core earnings and exclude transitory items
when setting performance targets for compensation. This, we suggest ex-
plains our ﬁnding of a causal relation between the disclosure of an alter-
native EPS ﬁgure and the inclusion of an EPS target in ESOs.
Barber, Kang, & Kumar (1998) contend that this role of accounting
is supported by evidence of strong contemporaneous correlations be-
tween accounting earnings and executive compensation (Lambert &
Larcker, 1987; Jensen & Murphy, 1990). They observe that accounting
earnings (in particular the persistence of those earnings) is used ef-
fectively and are relevant in setting executive compensation, namely,
cash salary and bonus. While they exclude stock-based compensation
components from this conclusion, stock-based compensation did not
have accounting performance targets for their sample ﬁrms, in con-
trast to the case in our sample.
Also, Biddle & Choi (2006) examine different deﬁnitions of income
across three applications; information content, predictive ability and ex-
ecutive compensation contracting. They conclude that for executive
contracting, net income (alternative EPS), rather than comprehensive
income (GAAP EPS) is most decision relevant, consistent with the
view of managers and prior contracting research (Holthausen & Watts,
2001).
We argue that the disclosure of an alternative EPS ﬁgure has been
shown in the literature (Lougee & Marquardt, 2004; Choi et al., 2007)
to be for the most part efﬁcient, particularly in the UK. Managers dis-
close an alternative EPS ﬁgure to provide a better indicator of sustain-
able earnings. Based on this evidence, we expect UK ﬁrms to behave
in an efﬁcient manner with respect to voluntary disclosures.1
While there is evidence suggesting managers behave opportunisti-
cally in response to the structure of their compensation, Nagar, Nanda,
& Wysocki (2003) contemplate that shareholders may anticipate (and
potentially desire) these managerial actions when designing compen-
sation plans. This is so equity-based compensation will provide man-
agers with incentives to be more forthcoming with disclosure. They
examine the relation between voluntary disclosure policies and the
portion of equity in CEO compensation. They provide evidence that
the extent of voluntary disclosure is positively related to the level of
CEO stock-based compensation and stockholding. Because voluntary
disclosure of management private information increases transparency
and reduces information asymmetry, Nagar et al. (2003) argue that
their ﬁndings provide evidence that stock-based compensation im-
proves the alignment between executives’ and shareholders’ interests.
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options in executive remuneration contracts is associated with
greater interest alignment. They argue that remuneration contracts
based on performance measures with direct effort implications (84%
of their sample ﬁrms have an EPS target) motivate managers to
exert higher effort and increase ﬁrm performance, consistent with
shareholders’ interest. Young & Yang (2011) also ﬁnd that share
repurchase activity is positively related to the presence of EPS perfor-
mance criteria in executive compensation. They present results which
indicate share repurchases motivated by EPS targets in executive
compensation suggest net beneﬁts to shareholders.
Accepting the evidence above, we expect that ﬁrms that include an
EPS performance criterion in their ESOs also disclose voluntarily an al-
ternative EPS ﬁgure. This is the case since under efﬁcient contracting
the introduction of accounting-based vesting criteria in managerial
compensation calls for informative accounting-based performance
measures, if managerial pay is to be strongly linked to performance. In
other words, given the availability of choices, a priori, it would be
expected that the disclosure of an alternative EPS ﬁgure would be pos-
itively related to the existence of an EPS performance target in execu-
tive remuneration as both represent efﬁcient contracting.
We propose the following hypothesis:
H1. The disclosure of an alternative EPS ﬁgure is positively related to
the existence of an EPS target in executive share option plans.
3. Research design
3.1. Sample selection
The sample comprises the 500 largest London Stock Exchange-listed
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms ranked by market capitalisation in 2001.2 We track
these ﬁrms and collect information also for 2002 and 2003. During this
sample period the use of ESOs was widespread, and more dominant
than LTIPs; hence, it provides a good opportunity to test the link be-
tween an EPS target and the disclosure of an alternative EPS. Details of
alternative EPS disclosures along with remuneration data were hand-
collected from ﬁrms’ published ﬁnancial statements. I/B/E/S-deﬁned
EPS was obtained directly from I/B/E/S. Financial statement, market
data and industry classiﬁcations were collected from Datastream and
the corporate governance data was supplied by Manifest Information
Systems Ltd. All sectors are represented in the sample using Datastream
Level 3 industry classiﬁcations. The industrial goods and services sector
has the largest representation accounting for 28% of sample ﬁrms.
The ﬁnal sample is reduced byﬁrmsmissing I/B/E/S EPS, Datastream
items and corporate governance data. In addition, the remuneration
data reported by some ﬁrms is insufﬁcient to determine the existence
or otherwise of an EPS growth target in ESOs. The ﬁnal sample consists
of 960 ﬁrm-years.
3.2. Disclosure choice model: variable deﬁnitions and model speciﬁcation
We build on Choi et al. (2005) who classify their variables into test,
control and indicator variables which are deﬁned below.
The test variables include NEGIBES, NEGPOS and MAGDIFF. NEGIBES
equals 1 if I/B/E/S deﬁned EPS (EPSIBES) is negative and 0 otherwise.
NEGIBES is expected to be negatively associated with the disclosure of
alternative EPS on the assumption that management will be keen to
avoid reporting a loss.
NEGPOS takes the value of 1 if FRS 3 EPS (EPSFRS3) is negative and I/
B/E/S-deﬁned EPS (EPSIBES) is positive and 0 otherwise. The probabil-
ity that an alternative EPS ﬁgure is disclosed is predicted to be2 While mandatory disclosure of performance conditions in ESOs was only intro-
duced for ﬁrms reporting on or after 31 December 2002, conditions for ESOs granted
in or before 2001 were generally available in the 2002 remuneration reports.positively related to NEGPOS. Choi et al. (2005) suggest that under
these circumstances, management face strong incentives to report I/
B/E/S-deﬁned EPS if this is deemed more informative regarding sus-
tainable earnings.
MAGDIFF is a measure of the relative uninformativeness of EPSFRS3
with respect to sustainable earnings. Evidence indicates that EPSIBES
are informative about sustainable earnings (Bradshaw & Sloan, 2002;
Brown & Sivakumar, 2003). It is the measure of the price-scaled
difference between EPSFRS3 and the corresponding EPSIBES ﬁgure:
MAGDIFF ¼ EPSitFRS3– EPSit IBES





=Pit ð1Þ
Choi et al. (2005) cite evidence in Bradshaw & Sloan (2002) and
Brown & Sivakumar (2003) to predict that the probability of manage-
ment disclosing an alternative EPS ﬁgure will be positively related to
MAGDIFF.
Choi et al. (2005) also include the following control variables, SIZE,
MTB, NANAL and PAGES which they draw from prior disclosure litera-
ture. Lang & Lundholm (1993), Clarkson, Koa, & Richardson (1994),
Iatridis (2008) and Iatridis (2011) among others have found a positive
association between ﬁrm size and the amount of voluntary disclosure.
SIZE is deﬁned as the natural logarithm of ﬁscal year-end market
capitalisation. The market-to-book (MTB) is the natural logarithm of
the market-to-book ratio deﬁned as the year-end share price per
share divided by the book value of shareholders’ funds per share and
is included as prior research ﬁnds it inﬂuences ﬁrms’ discretionary dis-
closure decisions (Chen, DeFond, & Park, 2002).
NANAL is the natural logarithm of the number of analysts from I/B/
E/S following the ﬁrm at the year-end and controls for differences in
the external information environment of ﬁrms (Lang & Lundholm,
1996; Bhushan, 1989; Chen et al., 2002). PAGES is the natural loga-
rithm of the number of pages in the published ﬁnancial statements
and measures a ﬁrm's general attitude towards disclosure (Walker
& Louvari, 2003).
In addition to the test and control variables above, Choi et al. (2005)
add two indicator variables. The ﬁrst isMAGDIFFINC representing the in-
teraction betweenMAGDIFF and an indicator variable taking the value of
1where EPSIBES is positive andmaterially greater than EPSFRS3, and0 oth-
erwise. The second is MAGDIFFDEC representing the interaction be-
tween MAGDIFF and an indicator variable taking the value of 1 where
EPSIBES is positive and materially less than EPSFRS3, and 0 otherwise.
Choi et al. (2005) argue that if alternative EPS disclosures are intended
to counter the relative lack of informativeness of EPSFRS3 for sustainable
earnings, then management should be as likely to disclose alternative
EPS when sustainable earnings fall below EPSFRS3 by a large amount as
they are when sustainable earnings exceed EPSFRS3 by a corresponding
amount. If, on the other hand, alternative EPS disclosures are opportu-
nistically motivated, the probability of disclosure is expected to fall
when EPSFRS3 exceeds sustainable earnings by a large amount.
We create an additional independent exploratory variable, TARGET
which is deﬁned as 1 if the ESOs component of executive remuneration
contains an EPS performance criterion and 0 otherwise. In line with the
H1 above, TARGET is expected to be positively associated with the dis-
closure of an alternative EPS ﬁgure. Information on the existence of an
ESO component of executive remuneration was hand-collected from ﬁ-
nancial statements along with whether or not the vesting of these ESOs
depends on a growth in EPS performance criterion. For the purpose of
this study, ESOs are deﬁned as share option plans (schemes) which
are open only to executives. All-employee share option plans and reve-
nue approved share option plans are not considered. The reason for this
is that the number of options allowed to be granted under the latter
plans is restricted, and are therefore not expected to provide incentives
to motivate executives to take actions to disclose an alternative EPS
ﬁgure or to manage earnings. LTIPs, share plans where the exercise
price is zero, are excluded regardless of whether or not a performance
Table 1
Disclosure - target relation and descriptive statistics.
Panel A: Relation between disclosure of adjusted EPS ﬁgures and the presence of an
EPS target in ESOs
N=960 Firm Frequency
Years (%)
Disclosure and target 610 63.54
No disclosure and target 108 11.25
Disclosure and no target 156 16.25
No disclosure and no target 86 8.96
960 100.00
Panel B: Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean St. dev 25th
percentile
Median 75th
percentile
NDISCL 960 0.798 0.402 1.000 1.000 1.000
TARGET 960 0.748 0.434 0.000 1.000 1.000
NEGIBES 960 0.138 0.345 0.000 0.000 0.000
NEGPOS 960 0.150 0.357 0.000 0.000 0.000
SIZE 960 12.792 1.530 11.731 12.631 13.768
MTB 960 0.720 0.844 0.154 0.653 1.145
NANAL 960 1.000 0.857 0.000 1.099 1.609
PAGES 960 4.172 0.321 3.989 4.159 4.331
MAGDIFF 960 0.095 0.216 0.006 0.019 0.066
MAGDIFFINC 960 1.076 2.131 0.000 0.000 1.301
MAGDIFFDEC 960 0.398 1.120 0.000 0.000 0.053
INTASSETS 960 0.201 0.206 0.031 0.133 0.303
Notes: Panel A of this table presents statistics on the bivariate relation between disclosure of
an alternative EPS ﬁgure and the presence of an EPS target in ESOs. Panel B presents the de-
scriptive statistics of the variables used in the Disclosure model (N=960). NDISCL takes the
value of 1 if ﬁrm i discloses an alternative EPS ﬁgure and 0 otherwise; TARGET is an indicator
variable taking the value of 1 if the ESO plan component of executive remuneration contains
an EPS performance criterion and 0 otherwise;NEGIBES is an indicator variable that takes the
value of 1 if EPSIBES≤0 and0 otherwise;NEGPOS is an indicator variable that takes the value of
1 if EPSFRS3b0 and EPSIBES>0, and 0 otherwise; SIZE is the natural logarithm of ﬁscal year-end
market capitalisation;MTB is thenatural logarithmof themarket-to-book ratio deﬁnedas the
year-end share price per share divided by the book value of shareholders’ funds per share;
NANAL is the number of analysts (from I/B/E/S) following the ﬁrm at the end of year t;
PAGES is the number of pages in the ﬁrm's published annual report and accounts;
MAGDIFF is the absolute price-scaled difference between EPSIBES and EPSFRS3; MAGDIFFINC
represents the interaction betweenMAGDIFF and an indicator variable taking the value of 1
when EPSIBES is positive and materially greater than EPSFRS3, and 0 otherwise; MAGDIFFDEC
represents the interaction betweenMAGDIFF and an indicator variable taking the value of 1
when EPSIBES is positive and materially less than EPSFRS3, and 0 otherwise; INTASSETS is
deﬁned as intangible assets divided by total assets.
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tached to LTIPs in themajority of our sample ﬁrmswas total sharehold-
er return and not an EPS growth target.
Consistent with prior literature, logit regression analysis is used to
analyse the impact on the disclosure of an alternative EPS ﬁgure of an
EPS target in ESOs. Year and industry indicator variables are included
in the model to control for year and industry effects. Eq. (2) includes
the exploratory variable and the test, control and indicator variables.
Prob NDISCL ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ Fðβ0 þ β1TARGETit þ β2NEGIBESit þ β3NEGPOSit
þβ4SIZEit þ β5MTBit þ β6NANALit þ β7PAGESit
þβ8MAGDIFFit þ β9MAGDIFFINCit þ β10MAGDIFFDECit
þYEARþ INDUSRTRY þ εitÞ
ð2Þ
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Panel A of Table 1 presents the relation betweenNDISCL and TARGET.
64% of ﬁrms disclose an alternative EPS ﬁgure and have an EPS target in
their ESOs, as well. Panel B presents the descriptive statistics. The mean
values of NDISCL (80%) and TARGET (75%) conﬁrm that the majority of
ﬁrms disclose an alternative EPS ﬁgure and have an EPS target in their
ESOs. The average size of the ﬁrms is £359 million and the MTB of the
ﬁrms is 0.72.
Table 2 presents the correlations between the variables.While there
are signiﬁcant correlations between some variables only three have
values above 0.5. This is still lower than the 0.8 cut-off which is indica-
tive of multicollinearity problems (Kennedy, 1992). So, we do not ex-
pect our models to suffer from multicollinearity problems. Subsequent
Variance Inﬂation Factor (VIF) analyses also conﬁrm this is the case.
4.2. Main regression analyses
Table 3 reports the Logit regression analysis explaining alternative
EPS disclosure choice. As hypothesised the disclosure of an alternative
EPS ﬁgure is positively related to the existence of an EPS target in
ESOs (TARGET). The effect is economically signiﬁcant. In particular, the
TARGET coefﬁcient is 0.584; given that we run a logistic regression this
coefﬁcient represents the log of odds of TARGET leading to an alternative
EPSﬁgure. Ifwe transform it to a probabilitywe ﬁnd the probability that
the existence of an EPS target will lead to the publication of an alterna-
tive EPS ﬁgure is 64%. So even after controlling for a range of other eco-
nomic determinants of the EPS disclosure choice, we match the
observations of our univariate tests (see Section 4.1).
Also, NEGIBES is signiﬁcant and negatively related to disclosure in
line with our prediction, on the basis that management will be eager
to avoid reporting a loss. The sign of the coefﬁcients on NEGPOS and
MAGDIFF are positively related to the disclosure decision and support
an attempt by management to report a ﬁgure which better informs
about sustainable earnings. These ﬁndings support the evidence in
Bradshaw & Sloan (2002) and Brown & Sivakumar (2003) that I/B/
E/S-deﬁned EPS is informative about sustainable earnings.
While NEGPOS is signiﬁcant, MAGDIFF is not, indicating that the
magnitude of the difference between EPSFRS3 and EPSIBES is not a sig-
niﬁcant factor in the decision to disclose an alternative EPS ﬁgure.
BothNANAL and PAGES are signiﬁcant in explaining the disclosure of
an alternative EPS ﬁgure by the ﬁrms in our sample. While wewere un-
able to predict the sign of the impact of these variables, NANAL has a
negative impact on the disclosure choice, substantiating a desire by
management to disclose an alternative (more informative EPS ﬁgure)
when there is less availability of an informative EPS ﬁgure from I/B/E/S.
Both MAGDIFFINC and MAGDIFFDEC test if disclosure is to provide
better information, and while the sign is not predicted, a signiﬁcantassociation is expected. A signiﬁcant relation is reported for
MAGDIFFINC but not MAGDIFFDEC. The coefﬁcient estimate for
MAGDIFFINC (where EPSIBES is both positive and materially greater
than EPSFRS3) is positive and signiﬁcant (at the 1% level) suggesting dis-
closure probability is an increasing function of the disparity between
EPSFRS3 and EPSIBES only when EPSIBES is materially greater than EPSFRS3.
The positive coefﬁcient for MAGDIFFDEC supports the idea that disclo-
sure probability is a function of the disparity between EPSFRS3 and
EPSIBES and that alternative EPS disclosure is intended to counter the rel-
ative lack of informativeness of EPSFRS3 for sustainable earnings. The fact
that it is insigniﬁcant though weakens this argument.
Collectively, these results appear to conﬁrm our conjecture that the
decision to disclose an alternative EPS ﬁgure is mainly driven by the de-
sire to provide more informative earnings ﬁgures.
Finally, the year indicator variables are positive and signiﬁcant, in-
dicating that the average level of alternative EPS disclosure increased
during our sample period.
We run Model 1 with an additional interaction term (TARGET *
MAGDIFFINC) on the basis that if an EPS target reﬂects efﬁcient
contracting then the interaction between TARGET and MAGDIFFINC
should be negative (assuming the positive value onMAGDIFFINC indi-
cates opportunism). The coefﬁcient of the interaction term is negative
Table 2
Pearson correlations.
Disclosure choice model
NDISCL TARGET NEGIBES NEGPOS SIZE MTB NANAL PAGES MAGDIFF MAGDIFFINC MAGDIFFDEC INTASSETS
NDISCL 1.000
TARGET 0.222*** 1.000
NEGIBES −0.289*** −0.325*** 1.000
NEGPOS 0.132*** 0.029 −0.168*** 1.000
SIZE 0.132*** 0.191*** −0.229*** −0.124*** 1.000
MTB 0.007 0.035 −0.012 −0.133*** 0.288*** 1.000
NANAL −0.001 0.092*** −0.135*** −0.109** 0.631*** 0.050 1.000
PAGES 0.157*** 0.117*** −0.094*** 0.013 0.581*** 0.045 0.357*** 1.000
MAGDIFF 0.038 −0.080* 0.115*** 0.532*** −0.279*** −0.262*** −0.147*** −0.005 1.000
MAGDIFFINC 0.190*** 0.103*** −0.202*** −0.212*** −0.004 −0.104*** −0.013 0.020 −0.099*** 1.000
MAGDIFFDEC −0.026 −0.011 −0.142*** −0.150*** 0.008 −0.032 0.036 −0.045 −0.017 −0.180*** 1.000
INTASSETS 0.184*** 0.010 −0.006 0.154*** 0.022 0.067** −0.135*** 0.102*** 0.010*** 0.136*** −0.143** 1.000
Notes: This table presents the Pearson correlations of the variables used in the Disclosuremodel (N=960). ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. All variables are deﬁned as in Table 1.
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niﬁcant, the sign is correct indicating that opportunism does not ap-
pear to prevail here (untabulated result).
Given the common exclusion of transitory items in both EPS targets
and alternative EPS ﬁgures disclosed by ﬁrms, we expect those ﬁrms
with higher intangible assets and an EPS target in executive compensa-
tionwill bemore likely to disclose an alternative EPSﬁgure.We test this
by runningModel 1 for (a) ﬁrmswith abovemedian intangibles and (b)
ﬁrms with below median intangibles. INTASSETS is deﬁned as the ratio
of intangible assets to total assets. The results are presented in columns
4 and 5 in Table 3, respectively. TARGET is positive and signiﬁcant at theTable 3
Disclosure choice model explaining alternative EPS disclosure.
Above median Below median
Variable Predicted
sign
Coefﬁcient Intangibles
coefﬁcient
Intangibles
coefﬁcient
Intercept ? −7.106*** −7.457*** −5.758***
(0.000) (0.008) (0.005)
TARGET + 0.584*** 1.243*** 0.160
(0.003) (0.000) (0.552)
NEGIBES − −0.952*** −0.951* −1.336***
(0.001) (0.053) (0.002)
NEGPOS + 1.319*** 0.731 1.642***
(0.001) (0.280) (0.005)
SIZE + 0.254** 0.322* 0.179
(0.012) (0.096) (0.146)
MTB ? 0.088 −0.268 0.127
(0.445) (0.130) (0.416)
NANAL ? −0.449*** −0.421 −0.286
(0.004) (0.261) (0.127)
PAGES ? 0.972*** 0.866 0.836*
(0.008) (0.184) (0.083)
MAGDIFF + 0.362 0.088 0.297
(0.482) (0.905) (0.764)
MAGDIFFINC ? 0.535*** 0.634*** 0.409*
(0.004) (0.008) (0.057)
MAGDIFFDEC ? 0.032 0.031 0.051
(0.711) (0.840) (0.611)
YEAR2002 ? 0.842*** 1.043** 0.844***
(0.000) (0.015) (0.002)
YEAR2003 ? 0.891*** 0.992** 0.823***
(0.000) (0.031) (0.003)
INDUSTRY DUMMIES YES YES YES
LOG LIKELIHOOD −387.349 −119.732 −242.916
CHI-SQUARE 132.310 68.690 63.110
P-VALUE 0.000 0.000 0.000
OBSERVATIONS 960 480 480
Notes: This table presents the logit regression results explaining alternative EPS disclosure.
Year (YEAR2002 and YEAR2003) and Industry dummies are included in all speciﬁcations.
Robust standard errors are estimated. The p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, *
denote signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. All other variables are deﬁned as in Table 1.1% level for ﬁrms with above median intangible assets and not signiﬁ-
cant for ﬁrms with belowmedian intangible assets. This result is highly
supportive of the argument that in ﬁrms withmore intangibles, the ex-
istence of an EPS target in executive compensation leads to the disclo-
sure of alternative EPS.
The results above provide evidence of a strong causal link between
EPS performance targets in executive compensation and the disclosure
of alternative EPS ﬁgures. We perform a number of robustness checks
which address endogeneity, selection bias, and direction of causality
and consider results after matching ﬁrms.
4.3. Endogeneity concerns—contract choice model
This study aims to expand our understanding on the alternative EPS
disclosure choice by showing that the structure of executive remunera-
tion contacts can affect this choice. Accordingly, H1 is designed to test
whether an EPS-based performance criterion in executive remunera-
tion is an explanatory factor in the decision to disclose an alternative
EPS ﬁgure. If the disclosure choice of ﬁrms with an EPS target differs
from those with no EPS target, this will raise the question of why
some ﬁrms choose an EPS target as the performance criterion. It is pos-
sible that the remuneration structure and disclosure choice are endog-
enous and jointly determined. This means that we need to control for
the endogeneity of contract choice and do so by modelling the choice
to include an EPS target in ESOs. So as a ﬁrst step, in this Section we
model the EPS target contract choice. In the next Section, we explicitly
control for selection bias using a recursive bivariate model.
We draw on the limited available literature and construct a model
to explain the decision by a ﬁrm to include an EPS target in its exec-
utive remuneration contract.
Our hypothesis on the disclosure of an alternative EPS ﬁgure is based
on the assumption that, on average, disclosure represents efﬁcient con-
tracting in agreement with Kuang & Qin (2009), Huang, Marquardt, &
Zhang (2010), and Young & Yang (2011) who report the impact of an
EPS target as being consistent with efﬁcient contracting. A positive rela-
tion between EPS targets and the disclosure of alternative EPS ﬁgures
would be consistentwith the idea ofmanagement disclosingmore infor-
mative earnings ﬁgures, i.e., strengthening the pay-performance link.
Huang et al. (2010) model the use of EPS as a performancemeasure
in executive bonus plans and illustrate that the choice of an EPS target
can be explained by economic determinants. Following Huang et al.
(2010) and Dey (2008), we proxy for agency conﬂicts using ﬁrm size
(SIZE), complexity (COMPLEX), free cash ﬂow (FCF), growth (MTB)
and ownership structure (MGRSHARES). In addition, we include NOISE,
INTASSETS, ETR, REGULATION, EXONBOARD, BRDSIZE and CEOCHAIR.
NOISE is deﬁned as the ratio of time-series variance of ΔEPS to time-
series variance of share returns over a ﬁve year period ending in the
year of interest. According to agency theory, EPS targets are less likely
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mance (Lambert & Larcker, 1987). Therefore, we expect a negative rela-
tion with the likelihood of using EPS as a performance measure. We
expect INTASSETS to be negatively associated with the use of EPS in
ESOs as Francis & Smith (1995) ﬁnd that incentive contracts are not ef-
fective in reducing the high agency costs of incentive activity. The effec-
tive tax rate (ETR) is included as a proxy for agency conﬂicts as Klassen
(1997)ﬁnds that ﬁrmswith high agency costs tend to be less concerned
with tax reporting than ﬁnancial reporting.
REGULATION is deﬁned as 1 if the ﬁrm operates in the telecom or
utility industries as an inverse proxy for agency costs as the regulator
will provide monitoring to reduce potential conﬂicts between man-
agers and outside shareholders. We expect a negative association be-
tween REGULATION and TARGET. Year and industry indicator variables
are included in the model to control for year and industry effects. We
run our contract choice model with and without corporate gover-
nance variables. Eq. (3) is our contract choice model.
Prob TARGET ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ Fðβ0 þ β1SIZEit þ β2COMPLEXit þ β3FCFit
þβ4MTBit þ β5ETRit þ β6NOISEit þ β7INTASSETSit
þβ8REGULATIONit þ β9MGRSHARESit
þβ10EXONBOARDit þ β11BRDSIZEit
þβ12CEOCHAIRit þ YEARþ INDUSTRY þ εitÞ
ð3Þ
In Table 4 column 3 which reports the results from Eq. (3) without
the corporate governance variables we see that SIZE, ETR, NOISE andTable 4
Contract choice model explaining EPS performance target in ESOs.
Variable Predicted
sign
Coefﬁcient Coefﬁcient Marginal
effect
Intercept ? −3.158*** −3.745***
(0.003) (0.001)
SIZE + 0.228*** 0.163* 0.029
(0.002) (0.064)
COMPLEX + 0.103 0.116* 0.020
(0.103) (0.078)
FCF + 0.002 0.002 0.000
(0.160) (0.140)
MTB − −0.117 −0.112 −0.020
(0.303) (0.351)
ETR + 1.282*** 1.246*** 0.219
(0.001) (0.001)
NOISE − −33.067** −31.011** −5.447
(0.020) (0.034)
INTASSETS − 0.251 0.112 0.020
(0.602) (0.817)
REGULATION − −1.216*** −1.188*** −0.200
(0.004) (0.006)
MGRSHARES − 0.710 0.125
(0.197)
EXONBOARD − 1.269* 0.223
(0.093)
BRDSIZE ? 0.096* 0.017
(0.064)
CEOCHAIR − −0.257 −0.048
(0.421)
YEAR2002 ? 0.138 0.166 0.029
(0.533) (0.458)
YEAR2003 ? 0.349* 0.392 0.067
(0.104) (0.070)
INDUSTRY DUMMIES YES YES
LOG LIKELIHOOD −408.912 −404.147
CHI-SQUARE 70.270 83.400
P-VALUE 0.000 0.000
OBSERVATIONS 793 793
Notes: This table presents the logit regression results on the determinants of an EPS target in
ESOs. Year (YEAR2002 and YEAR2003) and Industry dummies are included in both speciﬁca-
tions. Robust standard errors are estimated. The p-values are reported in parentheses ***, **, *
denote signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. All other variables are deﬁned as in Table 1.REGULATION are signiﬁcant in determining if a ﬁrm includes an EPS tar-
get in its ESOs. The coefﬁcients of both SIZE and ETR are positive,whereas
the coefﬁcients ofNOISE andREGULATION are negative; all are consistent
with our predictions. While COMPLEX, FCF and MTB are not signiﬁcant
their signs are as predicted. As expected,we report a negative and signif-
icant relation between REGULATION and TARGET.
We also consider corporate governance variables as the results for
these variables will shed further evidence on whether the inclusion of
an EPS target represents efﬁcient contracting or managerial power. If
weak corporate governance features result in an inefﬁcient design of
executive compensation contracts, good corporate governance struc-
tures should lead to superior compensation contracts and thus better
advance shareholders’ interest (Jensen, Murphy, & Wruck, 2004;
Bebchuk, Fried, & Walker, 2002; Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). Thus, if efﬁ-
cient contracting is behind the inclusion of an EPS target, then we
would expect a negative and signiﬁcant relation between our proxies
of managerial power and the inclusion of an EPS target in executive
compensation contracts.
We run Eq. (3) with four corporate governance variables, which are
MGRSHARES, EXONBOARD, BRDSIZE and CEOCHAIR. Huang et al. (2010)
expect EPS to be especially useful when there is a greater degree of sep-
aration of ownership and control and greater levels of asymmetry be-
tween managers and shareholders. MGRSHARES and CEOCHAIR are
proxies for managerial power (Bebchuk et al., 2002) and this would
lead us to predict that if managerial power is evident, these variables
would be positive and signiﬁcantly related to whether or not a perfor-
mance measure is included in share-based compensation.
Column 4 in Table 4 presents the results from the contract choice
model above with the corporate governance variables. MGRSHARES
and CEOCHAIR are our proxies for managerial power and we ﬁnd
these to be insigniﬁcant. As predicted, CEOCHAIR is negatively associ-
ated with the use of an EPS target, which we interpret as strengthen-
ing our contention that efﬁcient contracting is behind the choice to
include an EPS target in ESOs.
We note that agency theory predicts that the more noise a perfor-
mance measure contains, the less weight ﬁrms will place on that mea-
sure in executive remuneration contracts (Banker & Datar, 1989).
Therefore, under optimal contracting theory, NOISE is expected to be
negatively associated with the use of an EPS target as the noisier the
measure, the less likelywe expect it to be chosen as a performancemea-
sure. The highly signiﬁcant and negative result from NOISE (in both
models) provides strong support for our efﬁcient contracting premise.
The estimated marginal effect of NOISE is−5.447. This implies that an
increase in NOISE of one standard deviation will decrease the probabil-
ity of the ESOs in a ﬁrm having an EPS target by 544.7%.
Overall, the results in Table 4 provide an indirect indication that
efﬁcient contracting is driving the decision to include an EPS target
in ESOs and supports the conclusion that an EPS target in ESOs is in
line with optimal contracting theory.
4.4. A selection model
To address potential selection bias inNDISCLwe report in Table 5 re-
cursive bivariate model estimates. As shown above, a ﬁrm with an EPS
target in its ESOs ismore likely to disclose an alternative EPSﬁgure lead-
ing to potential selection bias problems in ourmain analysis. Given that
the dependent variables of interest, that is, NDISCL and TARGET, are
bivariate ones, we use a recursive bivariate probit model to control for
this effect (Greene, 1998). This technique leads to more efﬁcient esti-
mates compared to a Heckman model, when modelling bivariate
dependent variables. Column 3 reports the selection model where the
exogenous instrument BIG4, an indicator variable which takes the
value of 1 if the ﬁrm is audited by a BIG4 auditing ﬁrm and 0 otherwise,
is added to the disclosure choicemodel in Eq. (2). Selection bias arises if
the unobservable characteristics of the ﬁrms who disclose an alterna-
tive EPS are different from ﬁrms who do not disclose an alternative
Table 5
Bivariate probit model of an EPS target in ESOs on the disclosure of alternative EPS.
Variable Predicted
sign
Selection
coefﬁcient
Outcome
coefﬁcient
Itetercept ? 0.154 −2.177***
(0.860) (0.005)
TARGET + 1.753***
(0.000)
NEGIBES − −0.839*** 0.033
(0.000) (0.884)
NEGPOS + 0.180 0.324
(0.374) (0.998)
SIZE ? 0.165*** 0.031
(0.005) (0.614)
MTB ? −0.002 0.101
(0.983) (0.157)
NANAL ? 0.025 −0.161*
(0.764) (0.068)
PAGES ? −0.417* 0.283
(0.075) (0.188)
MAGDIFF + −0.204 0.487
(0.517) (0.121)
MAGDIFFINC ? 0.076** 0.141**
(0.019) (0.023)
MAGDIFFDEC ? −0.004 −0.004
(0.934) (0.817)
BIG4 ? 0.249 –
(0.169) –
Rho ? −0.792
CHI-SQUARE 359.830
P-VALUE 0.000
OBSERVATIONS 768
Notes: This table presents recursive bivariate probit model results on the EPS target and
NDISCL relation. Column 3 presents the selection model where the exogenous instrument
is BIG4which takes the value of 1 if a ﬁrm is audited by a BIG4 ﬁrm and 0 otherwise. Robust
standard errors are estimated. The p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote sig-
niﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. All other variables are deﬁned as in Table 1.
Table 6
Simultaneous equations (3SLS): NDISCL and TARGET.
Predicted
Variable Sign Coefﬁcient Coefﬁcient
Dependent variable NDISCL TARGET
TARGET + 0.370**
(0.041)
NDISCL + 0.808***
(0.000)
SIZE ? 0.018 0.020
(0.248) (0.152)
MTB ? 0.009 −0.023
(0.627) (0.329)
NEGIBES − −0.218***
(0.004)
NEGPOS + 0.060*
(0.089)
NANAL ? −0.033**
(0.020)
PAGES ? 0.037
(0.026)
MAGDIFF + 0.037
(0.449)
MAGDIFFINC ? 0.015***
(0.002)
MAGDIFFDEC ? −0.002
(0.778)
COMPLEX + 0.014*
(0.062)
FCF + 0.000
(0.661)
ETR + 0.066
(0.192)
NOISE − −6.752**
(0.014)
INTASSETS − 0.056
(0.391)
REGULATION − −0.156**
(0.015)
YEAR DUMMIES Yes
INDUSTRY DUMMIES Yes Yes
OBSERVATIONS 726 726
Notes: This table presents simultaneous regressions of NDISCL and TARGET. In Panel A, the
dependent variable is NDISCL. In Panel B, the dependent variable is TARGET. Intercepts not
reported. The p-values are reported in parentheses ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%,
and 10%. All variables are deﬁned as in Table 1.
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the result of FRS 3which allows but does not requireﬁrms to disclose an
alternative EPS ﬁgure (Walker & Louvari, 2003). Just over 13% of the
original ﬁrms have a missing value for NDISCL. The recursive bivariate
model procedure provides an estimate of whether the causal effects of
having an EPS target accounts for unobservable factors causing bias
and also for the heterogeneity in individual ﬁrm responses to an EPS
target in their ESOs. Column 4 in Table 5 presents the results from the
outcome model and importantly TARGET remains positive and
signiﬁcant.3
Furthermore, the evidence presented in Table 5 indicates that selec-
tion bias is unlikely to be the cause of our signiﬁcantﬁndings. Themodel
ﬁts the data well, chi2=359.82 and pb0.000.4 We should add the caveat here that the 3SLS model is best suited for continuous,
non-binary, dependent variables. Still, we are not aware of a more suitable technique4.5. Direction of causality
Our premise is that the alternative EPS disclosure choice is better un-
derstood if we show that the type of managerial reward contracts af-
fects this choice. One area of concern is the direction of causality
between our main variables of interest, that is, NDISCL and TARGET. In
particular, one could argue that the disclosure of an alternative EPS ﬁg-
ure could drive the decision to include EPS targets in managerial com-
pensation, if for example the disclosure choice is an indication of more
informative earnings. We test this in Table 6 which includes two speci-
ﬁcations, Column 3 has NDISCL as the dependent variable and we draw
independent variables from the disclosure choice model in Eq. (2). Col-
umn 4 has TARGET as the dependent variable and the independent vari-
ables are from the contract choice model in Eq. (3). To address the
direction of causality between NDISCL and TARGET, we estimate a3 The results hold even when we run a Heckman model.system of simultaneous equations using three-stage least squares
(3SLS).4 The results show that the direction of causality could run
both ways, but more importantly, when we control for reverse causali-
ty, the effect of TARGET on NDISCL remains signiﬁcant.
4.6. Propensity score matching
The problems of model sensitivity, lack of robustness, linear func-
tional form assumptions and the need for adequate counterfactuals
motivate the use of matching methods (Clatworthy, Makepeace, &
Peel, 2009). Matching is based on obtaining a credible counterfactual;
would ﬁrms have disclosed an alternative EPS ﬁgure if they did not
have an EPS target in their ESOs? In our analysis, ﬁrms with an EPS
target in their ESOs are matched to ﬁrms without an EPS target in
their ESOs on the basis of the predicted probability of having an EPS
target, i.e., the contract choice model in Eq. (3).
Table 7 presents the propensity score (PS) matching results based
on the contract choice model in Eq. (3) which includes independent
variables drawn from the extant literature explaining the decision byto address the issue of the direction of causality. We note that the recursive bivariate
technique addresses only selection bias problems and not direction of causality ones.
Table 8
Summary of robustness test for propensity score matching results applying different
matching algorithms.
Matching algorithm N=753 Treated Controls Difference S.E. t-stat
Radius ATT 0.865 0.764 0.102 0.013 2.09**
NN (1) ATT 0.865 0.760 0.105 0.058 1.97*
NN (3) ATT 0.865 0.756 0.110 0.013 2.20**
NN (5) ATT 0.865 0.761 0.104 0.049 2.13**
Kernel ATT 0.866 0.757 0.109 0.046 2.39***
Notes: This table presents theATT results for the propensity scoremodel after applying differ-
ent matching algorithms. Each matching algorithm imposes common support and a calliper
of (.01). The standard errors are calculated using bootstrapping because it accounts for the
fact that the propensity score is estimated. ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
5 See Smith & Todd (2005) and Imbens (2004) for technical details on the various
matching algorithms.
Table 7
Propensity score matching results for alternative EPS disclosure and an EPS target in
ESOs.
Variables Target No target % Bias reduction
SIZE†
Unmatched 12.870 12.320
Matched 12.773 12.801 94.9
COMPLEX†
Unmatched 3.412 2.995
Matched 3.345 3.370 94.0
FCF†
Unmatched 44.240 8.379
Matched 33.519 45.469 66.7
MTB
Unmatched 0.712 0.629
Matched 0.706 0.675 64.0
ETR†
Unmatched 0.265 0.167
Matched 0.262 0.251 89.4
NOISE†
Unmatched 0.001 0.003
Matched 0.001 0.001 98.0
INTASSETS
Unmatched 0.202 0.177
Matched 0.201 0.203 88.4
REGULATION†
Unmatched 0.027 0.090
Matched 0.028 0.021 89.7
MGRSHARES
Unmatched 0.076 0.076
Matched 0.078 0.066 −5847.8
EXONBOARD
Unmatched 0.477 0.461
Matched 0.480 0.461 −23.4
BRDSIZE†
Unmatched 8.545 7.713
Matched 8.399 8.141 69.0
CEOCHAIR
Unmatched 0.076 0.096
Matched 0.077 0.074 84.6
YEAR2003
Unmatched 0.379 0.324
Matched 0.367 0.367 99.4
OBSERVATIONS 753
ATTΔ 2.090**
ABS after matching 4.431
Notes: This table presents themeans of the covariates between the treated ﬁrms (TARGET=
1) and the control ﬁrms (TARGET=0), in columns 2 and 3 respectively, for the propensity
score matching model. Column 4 presents the % Bias reduction after matching for each of
the covariates. The balancing property is satisﬁed. †Means of treated and untreated
unmatched are signiﬁcantly different. ΔATT is signiﬁcant at the 5% level using bootstrap
standard errors. All variables are deﬁned as in Table 1.
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Eq. (3) does not meet the balancing property required for PS matching;
the variable YEAR2002 is not balanced and therefore the results
presented here omit YEAR2002. The PS matching results are robust to
various versions of the model which meet the balancing property re-
quirement, for example excluding (1) YEAR2002 and (2) MGRSHARES.
It is important to note that the results are robust to the exclusion of
MGRSHARES given the % Bias reduction (−5847.8) this variable reports
in Table 7. The absolute bias reduction (ABS) after matching is below
the benchmark of 5.Matching methods are not robust to “hidden bias” arising from the
existence of unobserved variables that simultaneously affect assign-
ment to treatment and the outcome variable (NDISCL). Rosenbaum
(2002) bounds analysis allows determination of how strongly an
unmeasured confounding variable must affect selection into treatment
in order to undermine the implications of a matching analysis. The re-
sults from Rosenbaum bounds analysis provide further evidence that
an EPS target does increase the probability of the disclosure of an alter-
native EPS ﬁgure.
We use various matching algorithms to test ifNDISCL remains signif-
icant after matching and the results, which we present in Table 8, indi-
cate that our results are robust to all different matching algorithms
used.5 Table 8 presents the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated
(ATT) for the various algorithms along with their signiﬁcance level. We
implement every matching algorithm with a calliper which represents
the maximum (absolute) difference of the propensity score allowed for
matching. In addition, we impose a common support, which means
the test is performed only on observations that had propensity scores
within the common region support. Heckman, Ichimura, & Todd
(1997) and Becker & Ichino (2002) argue that imposing the common
support restriction in the estimation of propensity scores improves the
quality of the estimates. Overall, the matching tests conducted in this
section highlight that the relation between EPS targets and the disclo-
sure of alternative EPS ﬁgures is not driven by confounding effects and
is robust to different speciﬁcations and assumptions.5. Discussion and conclusions
We apply several alternative research designs in an effort to ex-
plore the relation between the disclosure of an alternative EPS ﬁgure
and the existence of an EPS target in ESOs for UK ﬁrms for 2001–2003.
We ﬁnd the existence of an EPS target in ESOs is signiﬁcantly and pos-
itively related to the decision to disclose an alternative EPS ﬁgure and
this ﬁnding is robust.
Our study contributes to the existing literature by helping us under-
stand the alternative EPS disclosure choice better. In particular, we
show that the structure of executive remuneration has an impact on
this choice. We believe the contribution of this paper is signiﬁcant,
given the widespread use of alternative EPS ﬁgures in the UK, as well
as the intense academic interest in identifying the determinants of
this accounting choice. Our results indicate that future researchers
should control for governance characteristics, in particular managerial
pay arrangements, when examining alternative EPS disclosure choices.
We address concerns about the endogeneity of contract choice; we
include a model of contract choice and the variables used in this
model are used as covariates in PS matching and show that the results
are robust to the characteristics that might leave a ﬁrm disposed to in-
cluding an EPS target. We also address selection bias (recursive
236 C. Grey et al. / International Review of Financial Analysis 29 (2013) 227–236bivariate probitmodel) and direction of causality (3SLS). Our results are
robust to all of these tests.
This research is based on the period prior to the implementation of
IFRS in the UKwhich began in 2004. Given the prevalence of EPS targets
during this period, it provides a valuable setting to consider the link be-
tween executive compensation and a voluntary disclosure choice by
ﬁrms. There is scope for new work on how the implementation of
IFRS has inﬂuenced the disclosure of alternative EPS ﬁgures in the UK
and in other EU countries. Recent calls in the UK for increased transpar-
ency regarding all aspects of UK managerial compensation arrange-
ments may also give rise to further research opportunities. In addition,
it would be interesting to study the relation between the structure of
executive remuneration and the disclosure of an alternative EPS ﬁgure
given the recent trend to replace ESOs with LTIPs.
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